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This study examines the dynamics and determinants of inflation in the Ottoman Empire during the 1586-1913 
period. There might be two main reasons for inflation: fiscal expansion and monetary expansion where the 
monetary expansion could be generated through the debasement of local currency (Akçe). We used a set of 
political and structural variables in order to explain the change in the inflation dynamics. In particular, we 
considered the war years, periods of Ottoman history which show different characteristics (the slow down 
period, the recession period and the break up period) and the period of constitutional monarchy. Moreover, we 
tested if the inflation process was the same for each sultan and all of the sultan behaved differently from the rest 
of their reign during their first year. Accordingly, the empirical evidence reported here suggests that war 
accelerated inflation as expected and fiscal expansion rather than the debasement of the Akçe was a main reason 
for inflation. Moreover, the slow down, the recession and the break up periods affected inflation positively; both 
fiscal expansion and the debasement of the Akçe were seen in these three periods as sources of inflation. In 
addition, each sultan had different inflationary policies during his period. However, each sultan accelerated 
inflation in the first year of his reign by the debasement of the Akçe or by fiscal expansion. Last, the 
constitutional monarch period had a significant positive effect on inflation; however, fiscal expansion rather than 
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 This paper studies the dynamics and  determinants of inflation in the Ottoman Empire 
during the 1586-1913 period. There might be two main reasons for inflation; monetary 
expansion due to the generation of seigniorage revenue by debasing the Akçe and fiscal 
expansion. We used a set of political and structural variables in order to assess the dynamics 
of inflation and its alteration with these political variables. 
 We consider three main possible structures concerning the common notion of political 
intervention in an inflationary policy. Firstly, many wars were seen in the Ottoman period and 
financing a war means extra expenses. Hence, it could be interesting to examine the effects of 
war on the dynamics of inflation. Ferguson (1996) argues that war was inflationary in 
Germany during the First World War. Moreover, Bolbol (1999) finds that war was one of the 
main reasons for high inflation in Lebanon during the Civil War period. Similarly, our 
empirical results suggest that the war accelerated inflation, as was expected and fiscal 
expansion rather than the debasement of the Akçe was the source of inflation.  
The second structure is the Partisan Political-Business Cycle (PBC), initiated by Hibbs 
(1977), which deals with characteristic differences in the economic policies of governments 
according to their constituencies. By this line of thought, governments apply fiscal and 
monetary policies to favour their constituencies and economic outcomes such as the level of 
output and inflation: These variables fluctuate along lines as a function of the ideology of the 
party in power so that they will be re-elected. For example, Alesina and Sachs (1988) show 
that the Republican Party in the United States has been relatively more concerned than the 
Democratic Party about inflation rather than output since the partisan theory suggests that 
Democratic voters will be more concerned about unemployment relative to inflation than 
Republican voters. The deviation of output growth from trend occurred mostly in the first half 
of end term, while the rate of growth of inflation was systematically different for the entire 
term under the Democratic administrations. The Republican Party, on the other hand, tried to 
deviate inflation growth from the trend in the first half of the terms. That is, the real effects of 
new policies are stronger at the beginning of new administrations. Moreover, Alesina and 
Roubini (1992) show that elections and changes of governments in eighteen OECD 
economies affect inflation. They find that inflation tends to increase immediately after 
elections and long run partisan differences in the inflation rate are seen.    2
The Ottoman Empire was governed by sultans rather than political parties and there 
was no election system. Similarly, not all administrations had the same preferences on 
inflation because not everybody was affected by the inflation in the same way. The 
differences in the preferences of supporters caused the differences in the behaviour of each 
sultan. Hence, different processes were observed after the accession to the throne of new 
sultans. These processes represent attempts by the sultans to prevent rebellions by the soldiers 
and urban population. For example, the major constraint against the application of policies to 
overcome the unfavourable fiscal environment was the janissaries in Istanbul, special soldiers 
paid with the local currency (Akçe). For this reason, each sultan adopted different inflationary 
policies to gain the appreciation of his supporters and opponents in the first year of his reign. 
Therefore, we can examine how the Ottoman Empire shows the Partisan PBC or not by 
analysing each sultan’s inflationary acts. Our results suggest that each sultan’s reign showed 
different acceleration in inflation and the policies of the debasement of the Akçe and fiscal 
expansion were the main sources of inflation. Moreover, each sultan increased inflation in his 
first year on the throne as a result of the debasement of the Akçe or fiscal expansion.  
In addition, we can take into account the different historical eras (the slow down, the 
recession and the break up periods) in Ottoman history in order to see the waves of inflation 
and the sources of inflation during those periods since each era showed different social, 
economic and political characteristics. Our result shows that the slow down, the recession and 
break up periods affected inflation positively and the debasement of the Akçe or fiscal 
expansion were the main reasons of inflation.  
The third structure analyses the effects of the fractionalized governments (coalition or 
minority governments versus majority governments) on their inflationary policies. More 
fractionalized and more polarized governments (differences in ideological preferences) were 
seen in the constitutional monarchy period than in the absolute monarchy period. They faced 
greater difficulties in coordinating action over fiscal and monetary policies. Roubini and 
Sachs (1989) argue that it is more difficult for coalition governments to raise taxes and 
decrease government expenditures. Hence, a more fractionalized government causes higher 
budget deficits and inflation. Coalition is one of the main economic institutions that leads to 
chronic and persistent inflation (Arce and Daniel, 1994). Minority parties and coalition 
governments are more constrained by electoral concerns so they try to satisfy influential 
constituencies and special interests in order to be re-elected (Haynes and Stone, 1990). Hence, 
the debasement of Akçe and fiscal expansion caused acceleration in inflation to put in order 
unfavourable fiscal situations in the constitutional  monarchy era. Our empirical evidence   3
suggests that the period of constitutional monarchy had a positively significant effect on 
inflation. However, anti-debasement acts rather than debasement were seen, and fiscal 
expansion was the main reason for increasing inflation in this period.  
Pamuk (1997) argues that the fiscal and monetary conditions in the Ottoman Empire 
emerged as the primary explanation for the debasement of the Akçe during the seventeenth 
century. The Ottomans faced severe fiscal pressures and struggled with rising military 
expenditures and the adverse consequences of inflation during this period. One of the main 
responses to this environment was currency debasement, which provided temporary financial 
relief but also contributed to a new momentum of price increases. Hence, these results make 
his study resemble ours more. Our research differs from his study on three accounts. Firstly, 
he did not focus on the dynamics of inflation analyses deeply as we did; that is, he did not 
explain waves of inflation according to the important political structural variables. Secondly, 
Pamuk (1997) showed that inflation had adverse consequences on state finances. However, he 
only analyzed the debasement of the Akçe as a source of state finances that caused inflation, 
whereas, we also looked at the fiscal expansion as another main policy for inflation and 
examined the effects of fiscal expansion on inflation. Thirdly, he examined only the 
seventeenth century for the debasement analyses, while we took into account the historical 
eras of the Ottoman Empire (the slow down, the recession and the break up periods) and 
constitutional monarchy period in our analysis. 
 Our result shows that debasement was one of the main reasons for the acceleration of 
inflation in the seventeenth century. This result confirms Pamuk (1997). However, we also 
proposed that fiscal expansion was another main explanation for the variability of inflation in 
this period. Furthermore, his article provides evidence that the debasements were the results 
of fiscal difficulties and that the state benefited in the short run. There was no such long-term 
strategy during this particular period. Similarly, when we analysed each sultan’s period 
separately, we can see that they did not follow the same policy. However, debasement 
appeared in all three historical eras in Ottoman history except the period of constitutional 
monarchy.  
This study extensively analyzes inflation dynamics with the longest historical data that 
is available for the Ottoman Empire. In addition, we examined the effects of different social 
and political situations on inflation movements. Therefore, these explanations may contribute 
to an understanding of why fiscal deterioration and inflation arise in the Ottoman Empire.    4
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The data is described in the second 
section. The methodology is discussed and empirical evidence is reported in the third section. 
The fourth section presents our conclusions. 
 
II. The Consumer Price Index for Istanbul 1469-1918 
The data for the Consumer Price Index for Istanbul is the first of its type for the 
Middle East, in fact for anywhere in the non-European world. It is considered as the most 
detailed and reliable for these four and a half centuries (1469-1918). It was prepared by 
Şevket Pamuk and published by the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS) in 2000. The 
data is available in Tables 1-3. Table 1 shows the Consumer Price Index, which combines the 
food prices obtained from the account books of pious foundations (vakıf) with the prices of 
non-food items. Table 2 presents the annual silver content of the Akçe. Pamuk constructed 
price indices expressed in grams of silver which were obtained by multiplying the value of the 
price index by the silver content of the Ottoman currency for the same year. These indices are 
shown in Table 3. 
The prices for Istanbul were calculated utilizing a large volume of Ottoman archival 
documents. They were basically extracted from data on the prices of standard commodities: 
food and non-food items. Three separate price indices were constructed for the food items 
according to the type of institution involved in consumption, whereas only one price index 
was constructed for the non-food items. One of the food price indices is based on the account 
books and prices paid by the many pious foundations, both large and small, and their soup 
kitchens (imaret). The second food price index is based on the account books of the Topkapi 
Palace kitchen. The third utilizes the officially established price ceilings (narh) for the basic 
items of consumption in the capital city: Istanbul.  
Standard commodities were used for these price indices in order to minimize the 
effects of quality changes. Each of these food indices includes  the prices of ten to twelve 
main consumption items. These are as follows: flour, rice, honey, cooking oil, mutton, chick 
peas, lentils, onions, eggs, sugar (for the palace only), coffee (beginning in the seventeenth 
century for the palace, and in the eighteenth century for the pious foundations), and olive oil 
for burning. Among these, flour, rice, cooking oil, mutton, olive oil and honey provided the 
most reliable long term series and carried the greatest in the food budget.  The prices of non-
food items were obtained from a variety of sources, most importantly the palace account 
books. The commodities considered are soap, wood, coal and nails.   5
 The weight of food items in the overall indices was fixed between 75% and 80%, 
based on the available evidence regarding the budget of an average urban consumer. The 
weight of each commodity in the overall index was based on the shares of each in total 
expenditures of the respective institutions. Greater weight was given to the indices based on 
the prices paid by the soup kitchens and, more generally, the pious foundations because the 
palace and the narh prices might be considered as official or state controlled prices. The 
weights of the individual commodities were kept constant as long as they were included in the 
index. 
 
III. Empirical Evidence 
In order to capture the effects of political and structural changes on the dynamics of 
inflation, the transfer function analysis is used and the following model is estimated: 
 
where Xt is the policy variable in interest; p is the lag order; Zt is the political and structural 
variable and εt is the error term at time t. Here, γ is the coefficient of our interest to assess the 
effects of political and structural situations on inflation dynamics. 
  In order to conduct this study, a benchmark model is needed. An autoregressive model 
is estimated for the inflation process. First, inflation is calculated as the change in the 
logarithm of two consecutive price indices. Then, inflation was regressed on its own lags with 
a constant term. In order to determine the optimum lag order, the Final Error Criteria is used. 
This method determines the optimum lag order such that the residual term is no longer 
autocorrelated. The first four lags were used to account for the dynamics of inflation, 
indicating the AR(4) process. Hence, inflation was regressed on its four lags with the constant 
term and the results are presented in Table 4 in column I of Panel A. The data set on price 
indices calculated by Şevket Pamuk covers the period between 1469 and 1918, but we started 
the sample from 1586 due to the frequency of missing observations and adopted the AR(4) 
process for inflation. We ended the data in 1913 to avoid the hyperinflation of the First World 
War years. In addition to lag values, inflation was also regressed on some political and 
structural variables, the coefficients of which account for the change in the dynamics of 
inflation not in inflation.  
Getting involved in a war requires extra expenses. Therefore, we tested whether the 
policies adopted during the war years in order to struggle with military expenditures caused 
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inflation or not. In order to capture the war years, a dummy variable was designed. The war 
variable was added to the benchmark model (It takes the value of one if there was war in this 
year and zero otherwise). The empirical evidence suggests that the war years accelerated 
inflation. However, the coefficient of the war variable is not statistically significant.
1 This 
result is presented in Table 4 in column II of Panel A. 
The military strength of the Ottoman Empire caused heterogeneity of tax revenue in 
the different regions of the Ottoman Empire for the government spending requirements. Loss 
of some portion of land might dictate the government’s fiscal and monetary setting. These 
two factors might determine the inflation level. Thus, three dummy variables for the three 
different historical eras of the Ottoman Empire are introduced: the slow down (1586-1699), 
the recession (1700-1792) and the break up (1793-1913) periods. Inflation was regressed 
against its four lags and the three dummy variables. However, the constant term was not 
included in the regression. The technical reason behind this is to avoid what is referred to as 
the “dummy variable trap”. If the intercept term, which always implicitly takes the value of 
one, were included with the dummy variables, which always sum up to one, perfect multi-
collinearity arises. Thus, the constant term was dropped out in order to avoid the multi-
collinearity trap. The estimates of parameters are presented in Table 4 in column III of Panel 
A. The empirical evidence reveals that the slow down, the recession and the break up periods 
affected inflation positively. However, the increasing trend of inflation was highest in the 
break up period, which was the worst period of the empire; and lowest in the recession 
period. Even if the coefficient of the break up period is statistically significant, the coefficient 
was not significant for the recession period. Moreover, in order to test whether each period 
had different inflationary policy or not, we can perform the F-test. The F-statistics value is 
0.15, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that inflationary policy was the same in each period.  
A change of sultans can be taken as another explanatory variable for inflation 
dynamics since each sultan had different economic policies in order to manage the economy. 
Therefore, we tested whether the different policies of each sultan caused acceleration in 
inflation differently. Each sultan’s period dummy variables were designed for that and these 
were added to the benchmark model. The empirical results are presented in Table 4 in column 
IV of Panel A. The estimates suggest that the periods of Sultans Ahmed I, Murad IV,  Osman 
III, Mustafa IV, Mahmud II and Mehmed Resad V showed statistically significant increasing 
movement in inflation. The highest acceleration in inflation was seen in the Sultan Osman III 
period. However, the periods of Sultans Mustafa II and Murad V showed statistically 
                                                           
1 The level of significance is 5%, unless otherwise noted.   7
significant deflationary movements and the highest deflationary process was seen in the 
Sultan Mustafa II period. Moreover, in order to test whether each sultan had different 
inflationary act or not, we can perform the F-test. The result of the F-test is 1.96, which 
suggests that each sultan showed different inflationary acts at the 5% statistically significant 
level. 
Each sultan may prefer to have more expenses during the first year in his reign since 
he wants to prevent rivals in order to stay on the throne longer. He may also prefer to apply 
favourable fiscal and monetary policies to win the good will of soldiers, supporters and 
opponents. Hence, we test whether the first year policies of each sultan were one of the 
reasons for inflation dynamics or not. In order to capture this, a dummy variable was designed 
and the regression result is presented in Table 4 in column V of Panel A. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the first year policies of sultans affected inflation positively. However, 
the first year coefficient is not statistically significant.  
In order to explain the effect of government policies on inflation during the period of 
constitutional monarchy, a dummy variable was constructed and  added to the benchmark 
model. This is related to the effects of fractionalized governments on inflation. More 
fractionalized governments face higher budget deficits and greater difficulties in coordinating 
inflationary action in order to finance deficits. The result is showed in Table 4 in column VI 
of Panel A and we can say that the period of constitutional  monarchy had a positive 
significant effect on inflation. 
  The regression results of the slow down, the recession and the break up periods are 
presented in Panel B, Panel C and Panel D, respectively, in the Table 4. While the war years 
caused an increase in inflation during the slow down and the break up periods, deflationary 
movements were seen  during the recession period. However, the coefficient of war variable 
is statistically significant only in the slow down period. In addition, even though the highest 
inflation was seen in the Sultan Osman II period and the highest deflation was observed for 
the Sultan Mustafa I period in the slow down era, their coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Moreover, the emprical results suggest that the periods of Sultans Osman III and 
Selim III in the recession era and those of Sultans Mustafa IV, Mahmud II and Mehmed Resad 
V  in the break up era had  statistically significant effects on the acceleration in inflation. 
However, the Sultan Mustafa II period in the recession era and the Sultan Murad V period in 
the break up era showed a statistically significant deflation. The highest inflationary 
movement was seen in the Sultan Osman III period in the recession  era and the Sultan 
Mustafa IV period in the break up era. Furthermore, the Sultan Mustafa II period in the   8
recession era and the Sultan Murad V period in the break up era showed statistically 
significant and the highest deflation. These results are very parallel to the  Panel A column IV 
results in Table 4. Morever, although the coefficients of the first year variable are positive in 
both the recession and the break up periods, it is statistically significant only during the 
recession period. However, the coefficient of the first year variable  showed a deflationary 
trend during the slow down period, which is not statistically significant. Moreover, the results 
suggest that there was statistically significant acceleration in inflation during the period of 
constitutional monarchy as a result of the policies, which were applied in this period. 
  Inflation could be observed either due to fiscal expansion or seigniorage revenue due 
to the debasement of the Akçe in the long run. Hence, it is interesting to examine the source of 
inflation. Even if Spanish gold and silver were seen during these periods, we control these 
with the inflation dynamics, which is captured by the number of autoregressive lag orders. 
The empirical results of the debasement of the Akçe are presented in Table 5. The Table 6 
results are based on the price indices expressed in grams of silver. It is worth mentioning that 
even though nominal prices increased, prices expressed in grams of silver stayed in the 
relatively narrow range since the changes in prices in this index depend on the change in 
grams of silver. Therefore, the difference between two prices gives us a change in the grams 
of silver. The change in the grams of silver might be used as a fiscal tool given that there was 
no persistent supply shock and gold imports at accelerating rate. Thus, if the increase in price 
level is not due to a monetary factor, then it should be due to a fiscal factor. Hence, the 
empirical results of fiscal expansion are presented in Table 6. The negative coefficients in 
Table 5 represent debasement policies and the positive coefficients in Table 6 represent fiscal 
expansion policies.  
Wars require extra expenses; in particular extra sources of increasing revenue must be 
relied on. According to the empirical results that are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column II 
of Panel A, the war years showed anti-debasement acts, but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. In addition, statistically significant fiscal expansions were seen in the war years. 
Hence, we can say that fiscal expansion rather than debasement was the main reason for 
inflation during the war years. Furthermore, the war years caused statistically significant anti-
debasement movements in the recession and break up periods. However, the debasement was 
seen due to the effects of war years in the slow down period but its coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Moreover, though the war variable has positive effects on the fiscal 
expansion in the three historical eras, the coefficient of the war variable is not statistically 
significant in the recession period. These results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column II   9
of Panel B, Panel C and Panel D. Therefore, we can conclude that fiscal expansion was the 
main reason for inflation in the war years during the three historical eras as well. In addition, 
debasement was the main inflationary policy to overcome the fiscal deterioration for the slow 
down, the recession and the break up periods. However, the coefficient of the slow down 
period is not statistically significant. These are presented in Table 5 in column III of Panel A. 
Although the slow down and the break up period showed fiscal expansion as a source of 
inflation, their coefficients are not statistically significant. Moreover, a fiscal shrink was seen 
in the recession period but its effect was not statistically significant. These results are 
represented in Table 6 in column III of Panel A. The highest debasement was seen in the 
break up period and the highest fiscal expansion was seen in the slow down period.  
Each sultan’s inflationary acts can also be interpreted with the estimates reported in 
Tables 5 and 6 in column IV of Panel A. The F-statistics suggest that each sultan adopted 
different debasement and fiscal policies and accelerated inflation differently. The F-statistics 
are 1.92 for the equality of sultan dummies in Table 5 and 1.64 for the equality of sultan 
dummies in Table 6. According to the empirical results, the periods of Sultans Mustafa I, 
Mehmed IV, Mahmud I, Abdulhamid I and  Mahmud II showed statistically significant 
adaptation of debasement policies. Although most of the sultans' periods represented 
debasement, the highest acceleration of debasement was seen in the Sultan Süleyman II period 
but its coefficient is not statistically significant. However, Pamuk (2000, p.204-217) argues 
that the greatest debasement was seen in the Sultan Mahmud II period in the Ottoman Empire. 
Hence, this result does not support our expectations. The estimates we report capture the 
debasement dynamic acceleration rather than the debasement itself. Hence, this could be the 
main reason for our differences. Furthermore, the periods of Sultans Ahmed I, Mustafa IV and 
Mehmed Resad V showed statistically significant fiscal expansion policies and the highest 
fiscal expansion was seen in the Sultan Mustafa IV period. However, the periods of Sultans 
Mustafa II and Murad V showed statistically significant fiscal shrink policies and the highest 
shrinkage can be seen in the Sultan Mustafa II period. In addition, the periods of Sultans 
Mustafa I, Murad IV and Mehmed IV showed statistically significant debasement in the slow 
down era. The periods of Sultans Mahmud I, Mustafa III, Abdulhamid I and Selim III showed 
statistically significant adoption of debasement policies in the recession era. The Sultan 
Mahmud II period had a statistically significant coefficient for the debasement in the break up 
era. The highest debasement was seen in the Sultan Süleyman II period in the slow down era 
but its coefficient is not statistically significant. The Sultan Selim III period in the recession 
era and the Sultan Mahmud II period in the break up era showed the highest statistically   10
significant debasement. The highest and statistically significant fiscal expansion was seen in 
the Sultan Ahmed I period in the slow down era. Although the Sultan Osman III period 
showed the highest fiscal expansion in the recession era, its coefficient is not statistically 
significant. The periods of Sultans Mustafa IV and Mehmed Resad V showed statistically 
significant adoption of fiscal expansion policies and the highest fiscal expansion was seen in 
the Sultan Mustafa IV period in the break up era. These empirical results are presented in 
Tables 5 and 6 in column III of Panel B, Panel C and Panel D and they are very parallel to the 
Panel A (column IV) results in Tables 5 and 6. Also, the empirical evidence suggests that 
each sultan choose debasement or fiscal expansion in the first year of his reign in order to win 
the goodwill of the soldiers and urban population so that he could stay on the throne. The 
results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column V of Panel A. Also, the first year results that 
are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column IV of Panel B, Panel C and Panel D showed that 
both debasement and fiscal expansion were the reasons for inflation in the recession and 
break up periods. Although debasement was seen in the slow down period, fiscal shrinkage   
rather than fiscal expansion was seen in this era. However, the coefficients of the first year 
variable are not statistically significant. In addition, the period of constitutional monarchy 
showed statistically significant anti-debasement policies. The empirical results suggest that 
only fiscal expansion was the main source of the acceleration in inflation during the period of 
constitutional monarchy. These results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column VI of Panel 
A and in column V in Panel D. Pamuk (2000, p.222-242) says that debasement ended after 
1844. Thus, our results are parallel to his findings. 
Performing the regression analysis as an AR(4) process decreases the number of 
observations in the analyses due to the frequency of missing observations. Hence, we apply 
the AR(1) process for the inflation dynamics. In this case, we added a new dummy variable 
for the rise period (1478-1585). The basic results of the analyses were robust.
2 The empirical 
evidence suggests that war accelerated inflation as expected and fiscal expansion rather than 
the debasement of the Akçe was the main reason for inflation. Moreover, the slow down, the 
recession and the break up periods affected inflation positively; both fiscal expansion and the 
debasement of the Akçe were seen as sources of inflation during these three periods. However, 
the rise period is associated with lower inflation. Thus, during the early years of the empire 
(that is the rise period), there was no need to rely on inflationary policies. Hence, the empire 
had some ways of increasing its revenue other than the monetary or fiscal ones during  
                                                           
2 These estimates are available from the authors upon request.   11
the early years. However, it is important to note that even though the rise period does not 
show any debasement acts, we can see that the deflationary trend in inflation came from the 
fiscal shrinkage in the rise period, probably due to the more spoils rather than lower 
government spending. In addition, each sultan showed different inflationary policies in his 
period. However, each sultan accelerated inflation in the first year of his reign by the 
debasement of the Akçe or fiscal expansion. Lastly, the constitutional monarchy period had a 
positively significant effect on inflation; however, fiscal expansion rather than the debasement 
of the Akçe was the source of inflation in this period. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this study, we examined the dynamics of inflation in the Ottoman Empire during the 
1586-1913 period. We focused on two main inflationary acts, fiscal expansion and 
seigniorage revenue due to the debasement of the Akçe in order to explain the behaviour of 
inflation. We used a set of political and structural variables, the coefficients of which account 
for the change in the dynamics of inflation. We also extended our sample starting point to 
1478 to apply the AR(1) process to examine dynamics of inflation. Accordingly, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the war years accelerated inflation as we expected and fiscal expansion 
rather than debasement was the main inflationary policy to cope with war expenses. 
Moreover, the slow down, the recession and the break up periods affected inflation positively. 
Both fiscal expansion and debasement were seen in these three periods as sources of inflation. 
However, deflationary movement was seen during the rise period due to fiscal shrinkage. In 
addition, each sultan showed different inflationary policies in his period. However, the first 
year of each sultan accelerated inflation by debasement or fiscal expansion. These results are 
consistent with the Partisan PBC. Furthermore, the period of constitutional monarchy had 
positively significant effect on inflation. However, we can see fiscal expansion rather than 
debasement in the period of constitutional monarchy as a main inflationary policy. This result 
is in conformity with our expectations since fractionalised government raises inflation. It is 
important to note that there is not much difference between the AR(1) and the AR(4) process 
for examining the sources of dynamics of inflation since the signs of the coefficients of the 
variables are almost the same. 
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Table 1: CPI values for the 1469-1918 period 
Year CPI Year CPI Year CPI Year CPI Year CPI Year CPI Year CPI Year  CPI 
1469  1  1531  na  1593 3,39 1655 4,54 1717 7,02 1779  19,12  1841  177,71  1903  207,66 
1470 na 1532 na 1594  3,88  1656  4,82  1718  6,75  1780  18,94  1842  189,33  1904  208,84 
1471 1,16 1533  na  1595 4,14 1657 6,25 1719 6,91 1781  17,43  1843  193,12  1905  219,55 
1472 na 1534 na 1596  5,23    1658  5,69  1720  7,38  1782  15,12  1844  169,24  1906  220,2 
1473 1,48 1535  na  1597 6,24 1659 5,14 1721 6,95 1783  15,89  1845  172,46  1907  235,28 
1474 1,16 1536  na  1598 6,09 1660 6,01 1722 6,57 1784 15,2 1846  182,39  1908  254,32 
1475 na 1537 na 1599  4,85  1661  7,23  1723  6,34  1785  17,18  1847  162,65  1909  258,91 
1476 na 1538 na 1600  4,79  1662  5,83  1724  6,67  1786  19,22  1848  220,16  1910  263,86 
1477 na 1539 na 1601  4,45  1663  5,15  1725  7,17  1787  15,49  1849  184,51  1911  284,91 
1478 na 1540 na 1602  4,44  1664  5,05  1726 6,9 1788  16,01  1850  162,84  1912  306,99 
1479 na 1541 na 1603  4,69  1665  4,93  1727  6,23  1789  21,15  1851  174,59  1913  307,59 
1480 na 1542 na 1604  6,98  1666  5,28  1728  7,53  1790  26,85  1852  173,17  1914  307.59 
1481 na 1543 na 1605  6,35  1667  5,94  1729  8,08  1791  22,23  1853  186,85  1915      369,1 
1482 na 1544 na 1606  6,28  1668  6,34  1730 6,2 1792  22,09  1854 na 1916  768,97 
1483 na 1545 na 1607 na 1669  6,42  1731  7,97  1793  24,85  1855  242,06  1917  2306,9 
1484 na 1546 na 1608 na 1670  6,25  1732 na 1794 na 1856  309,68  1918  5536,57
1485 na 1547 na 1609 na 1671  6,07  1733 na 1795  23,63  1857  307,24  
1486 na 1548 na 1610  4,44  1672  6,65  1734  6,74  1796  24,34  1858  324,39  
1487 na 1549 na 1611 4,1 1673  6,18  1735  6,72  1797  28,71  1859  283,97  
1488 na 1550 na 1612  4,12  1674  6,66  1736  7,97  1798  24,04  1860  282,38  
1489 1,3 1551 na 1613  4,05  1675 7,3 1737  8,12  1799  23,81  1861  335,54  
1490 1,09 1552  na  1614 4,16 1676 7,79 1738 8,92 1800  na  1862  301,87   
1491 na 1553 na 1615  4,82  1677  7,78  1739  8,35  1801  24,83  1863 na   
1492 na 1554 na 1616  5,26  1678  7,57  1740  10,96  1802  23,3  1864 na   
1493 na 1555 1,5 1617  5,06  1679  8,39  1741  10,91  1803  28,15  1865 na   
1494  na  1556 1,78 1618 3,99 1680 7,66 1742  10,65  1804  32,67  1866  na   
1495 na 1557 na 1619  4,44  1681  7,51  1743  8,89  1805  41,5  1867  273,12  
1496 na 1558 na 1620  4,63  1682 6,8 1744  8,01  1806  33,44  1868  273,39  
1497 na 1559 na 1621 7,1 1683  7,79  1745  10,39  1807  42,64  1869  247,83  
1498 na 1560 na 1622  7,34  1684  7,09  1746  7,33  1808  42,12  1870  280,93  
1499 na 1561 na 1623 na 1685  7,44  1747  10,09  1809  43,75  1871  268,98  
1500 na 1562 na 1624  6,88  1686  8,13  1748  10,91  1810  37,61  1872  287,5   
1501 na 1563 na 1625  6,33  1687  7,68  1749  11,18  1811  58,32  1873  312,06  
1502 na 1564 na 1626 4,2 1688  7,18  1750  9,89  1812  44,6  1874  285,07  
1503 na 1565 na 1627  4,71  1689  7,29  1751  10,17  1813  44,8  1875  263,41  
1504 na 1566 na 1628  4,49  1690  7,72  1752  9,23  1814  45,99  1876  254,88  
1505 na 1567 na 1629 4,4 1691  9,55  1753 7,7 1815  45,93  1877  261,92  
1506 na 1568 na 1630  4,47  1692  8,95  1754  7,88  1816  48,84  1878  239,57  
1507  na  1569 1,86 1631 5,18 1693 7,42 1755 10,4 1817  50,03  1879  248,32   
1508 na 1570  1,94  1632  5,51  1694 na 1756  10,47  1818  51,46  1880  249,66  
1509 na 1571 na 1633  5,32  1695 na 1757  12,29  1819  67,05  1881 na   
1510 na 1572 na 1634  5,36  1696  7,98  1758  12,24  1820  49,34  1882 na   
1511  na  1573 2,06 1635 5,05 1697 7,22 1759  10,78  1821  51,81  1883  na   
1512 na 1574  1,98  1636  5,31  1698 7,5 1760  11,05  1822  52,69  1884  222,74  
1513  na  1575 1,99 1637 6,31 1699 7,37 1761  10,12  1823  53,32  1885  207,24   
1514 na 1576 na 1638  6,36  1700  7,94  1762  12,35  1824  51,66  1886  231,55  
1515 na 1577 na 1639  6,05  1701  6,95  1763  9,29  1825  51,97  1887  254,77  
1516 na 1578 na 1640  5,19  1702  5,06  1764  9,62  1826  66,27  1888  245,81  
1517 na 1579 na 1641  4,45  1703  4,99  1765 9,8 1827  73,05  1889  255,2   
1518 na 1580 na 1642  4,29  1704 5,3 1766  9,81  1828  92,59  1890  264,52  
1519 na 1581 na 1643  3,79  1705  7,46  1767  10,99  1829  85,67  1891  274,42  
1520 na 1582 na 1644  4,04  1706  5,58  1768  12,09  1830  85,39  1892  245,79  
1521 na 1583 na 1645  3,95  1707 5,5 1769  16,02  1831  110,42 1893  243,36  
1522 na 1584 na 1646  4,19  1708 na 1770  19,12  1832  114,96 1894  223,02  
1523 na 1585  2,36  1647  4,21  1709  5,69  1771 19 1833  115,25 1895  225,91  
1524  na  1586 3,34 1648 4,78 1710 5,52 1772  18,64  1834  122,58 1896  219,7   
1525 na 1587  3,53  1649 4,8 1711  7,34  1773  17,18  1835  135,22 1897  212,23  
1526  na  1588 4,45 1650 4,31 1712 6,89 1774  17,12  1836  112,71 1898  211,35   
1527 1,84 1589 3,09 1651  na  1713 6,43 1775  11,86  1837  193,28 1899  208,4   
1528 1,89 1590 4,32 1652 4,41 1714  7,7  1776  na  1838  161,11 1900  210,72   
1529 na 1591  3,31  1653  4,58  1715  7,44  1777 na 1839  150,02 1901  195,72  
1530  na  1592 3,08 1654 4,51 1716 6,66 1778  20,69  1840  158,58 1902  197,37   
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Table 2: Silver Content in Akçe values  for the 1469-1918 period 
 
Year Grams Year Grams Year Grams Year Grams Year Grams Year Grams Year  Grams  Year  Grams 
1469 0,86 1531  na  1593 0,34 1655 0,28 1717  0,133  1779  0,0908  1841  0,0078  1903  0,00833
1470 na 1532 na 1594  0,34  1656  0,28  1718  0,133  1780  0,0833  1842  0,0078  1904  0,00833
1471 0,84 1533  na  1595 0,34 1657 0,28 1719  0,133  1781  0,0833  1843  0,0078  1905  0,00833
1472 na 1534 na 1596  0,23  1658  0,28  1720  0,132  1782  0,0833  1844  0,00833  1906  0,00833
1473 0,84 1535  na  1597 0,23 1659 0,23 1721  0,132  1783  0,0833  1845  0,00833  1907  0,00833
1474 0,84 1536  na  1598 0,23 1660 0,23 1722  0,132  1784  0,0833  1846  0,00833  1908  0,00833
1475 na 1537 na 1599  0,23  1661  0,23  1723  0,132  1785  0,0833  1847  0,00833  1909  0,00833
1476 na 1538 na 1600  0,29  1662  0,23  1724  0,132  1786  0,0833  1848  0,00833  1910  0,00833
1477 na 1539 na 1601  0,29  1663  0,23  1725  0,132  1787  0,0833  1849  0,00833  1911  0,00833
1478 na 1540 na 1602  0,29  1664  0,23  1726  0,132  1788  0,0783  1850  0,00833  1912  0,00833
1479 na 1541 na 1603  0,29  1665  0,23  1727  0,132  1789  0,0575  1851  0,00833  1913  0,00833
1480 na 1542 na 1604  0,29  1666  0,23  1728  0,132  1790  0,0575  1852  0,00833  1914  0,00833
1481 na 1543 na 1605  0,29  1667  0,23  1729  0,132  1791  0,0575  1853  0,00833  1915  na 
1482 na 1544 na 1606  0,29  1668  0,23  1730  0,124  1792  0,0575  1854  na  1916  na 
1483 na 1545 na 1607 na 1669  0,21  1731  0,124  1793  0,0575  1855  0,00833  1917  na 
1484 na 1546 na 1608 na 1670  0,21  1732 na 1794 na 1856  0,00833  1918  na 
1485 na 1547 na 1609 na 1671  0,21  1733 na 1795  0,0492  1857  0,00833    
1486 na 1548 na 1610  0,29  1672  0,21  1734  0,124  1796  0,0492  1858  0,00833    
1487 na 1549 na 1611  0,29  1673  0,21  1735  0,124  1797  0,0492  1859  0,00833    
1488 na 1550 na 1612  0,29  1674  0,21  1736  0,124  1798  0,0492  1860  0,00833    
1489 0,68 1551  na  1613 0,29 1675 0,21 1737  0,124  1799  0,0492  1861  0,00833     
1490 0,68 1552  na  1614 0,29 1676 0,21 1738  0,124  1800  na  1862  0,00833     
1491 na 1553 na 1615  0,29  1677  0,21  1739  0,124  1801  0,0492  1863  na     
1492 na 1554 na 1616  0,29  1678  0,21  1740  0,121  1802  0,0492  1864  na     
1493  na  1555 0,66 1617 0,29 1679 0,21 1741  0,121  1803  0,0492  1865  na     
1494  na  1556 0,66 1618 0,28 1680 0,21 1742  0,121  1804  0,0492  1866  na     
1495 na 1557 na 1619  0,28  1681  0,21  1743  0,121  1805  0,0492  1867  0,00833    
1496 na 1558 na 1620  0,28  1682  0,21  1744  0,121  1806  0,0492  1868  0,00833    
1497 na 1559 na 1621  0,28  1683  0,21  1745  0,121  1807  0,0492  1869  0,00833    
1498 na 1560 na 1622  0,23  1684  0,21  1746  0,121  1808  0,0492  1870  0,00833    
1499 na 1561 na 1623 na 1685  0,21  1747  0,121  1809  0,0368  1871  0,00833    
1500 na 1562 na 1624  0,12  1686  0,21  1748  0,121  1810  0,0312  1872  0,00833    
1501 na 1563 na 1625  0,28  1687  0,21  1749  0,121  1811  0,0312  1873  0,00833    
1502 na 1564 na 1626  0,28  1688  0,21  1750  0,121  1812  0,0312  1874  0,00833    
1503 na 1565 na 1627  0,28  1689  0,21  1751  0,121  1813  0,0312  1875  0,00833    
1504 na 1566 na 1628  0,23  1690  0,13  1752  0,121  1814  0,0312  1876  0,00833    
1505 na 1567 na 1629  0,23  1691  0,13  1753  0,121  1815  0,0312  1877  0,00833    
1506 na 1568 na 1630  0,23  1692  0,13  1754  0,118  1816  0,0312  1878  0,00833    
1507  na  1569 0,61 1631 0,23 1693 0,13 1755  0,118  1817  0,0312  1879  0,00833     
1508 na 1570  0,61  1632  0,23  1694 na 1756  0,118  1818  0,0368  1880  0,00833    
1509 na 1571 na 1633 0,2 1695 na 1757  0,095  1819  0,0368  1881  na     
1510 na 1572 na 1634 0,2 1696  0,132  1758  0,095  1820  0,0246  1882  na     
1511 na 1573  0,61  1635  0,18  1697  0,132  1759  0,095  1821  0,0246  1883  na     
1512 na 1574  0,61  1636  0,18  1698  0,132  1760  0,095  1822  0,0193  1884  0,00833    
1513 na 1575  0,61  1637  0,18  1699  0,132  1761  0,095  1823  0,0193  1885  0,00833    
1514 na 1576 na 1638  0,18  1700  0,132  1762  0,095  1824  0,0193  1886  0,00833    
1515 na 1577 na 1639  0,18  1701  0,132  1763  0,095  1825  0,0193  1887  0,00833    
1516 na 1578 na 1640  0,16  1702  0,132  1764  0,095  1826  0,0193  1888  0,00833    
1517 na 1579 na 1641  0,28  1703  0,132  1765  0,095  1827  0,0193  1889  0,00833    
1518 na 1580 na 1642  0,28  1704  0,132  1766  0,0958 1828  0,0123  1890  0,00833    
1519 na 1581 na 1643  0,28  1705  0,132  1767  0,0958 1829  0,006  1891  0,00833    
1520 na 1582 na 1644  0,28  1706  0,132  1768  0,0958 1830  0,006  1892  0,00833    
1521 na 1583 na 1645  0,28  1707  0,132  1769  0,0958 1831  0,0044  1893  0,00833    
1522 na 1584 na 1646  0,28  1708 na 1770  0,0958 1832  0,0078  1894  0,00833    
1523 na 1585  0,61  1647  0,28  1709  0,128  1771  0,0958 1833  0,0078  1895  0,00833    
1524 na 1586  0,34  1648  0,28  1710  0,128  1772  0,0958 1834  0,0078  1896  0,00833    
1525 na 1587  0,34  1649  0,28  1711  0,128  1773  0,0958 1835  0,0078  1897  0,00833    
1526 na 1588  0,34  1650  0,28  1712  0,128  1774  0,0908 1836  0,0078  1898  0,00833    
1527 0,66 1589 0,34 1651  na  1713  0,128  1775  0,0908 1837  0,0078  1899  0,00833     
1528 0,66 1590 0,34 1652 0,28 1714  0,128  1776  na  1838  0,0078  1900  0,00833     
1529 na 1591  0,34  1653  0,28  1715  0,128  1777 na 1839  0,0078  1901  0,00833    
1530 na 1592  0,34  1654  0,28  1716  0,133  1778  0,0908 1840  0,0078  1902  0,00833    14 
Table 3: CPI Silver Grams values  for the 1469-1918 period 
Year Sgrams Year Sgrams Year Sgrams Year Sgrams Year Sgrams Year Sgrams Year Sgrams Year Sgrams
1469  1  1531  na  1593 1,34 1655 1,47 1717 1,08 1779 2,01 1841 1,61 1903  2 
1470  na  1532  na  1594 1,54 1656 1,56 1718 1,04 1780 1,83 1842 1,72 1904 2,01 
1471 1,12 1533  na  1595 1,64 1657 2,02 1719 1,06 1781 1,68 1843 1,75 1905 2,12 
1472  na  1534  na  1596 1,36 1658 1,84 1720 1,12 1782 1,46 1844 1,63 1906 2,12 
1473 1,43 1535  na  1597 1,63 1659 1,39 1721 1,06 1783 1,53 1845 1,66 1907 2,27 
1474 1,13 1536  na  1598 1,59 1660 1,63 1722  1  1784 1,47 1846 1,76 1908 2,45 
1475  na  1537  na  1599 1,26 1661 1,96 1723 0,97 1785 1,66 1847 1,57 1909  2,5 
1476  na  1538  na  1600  1,6  1662 1,58 1724 1,02 1786 1,85 1848 2,12 1910 2,54 
1477  na  1539  na  1601 1,48 1663 1,39 1725 1,09 1787 1,49 1849 1,78 1911 2,75 
1478  na  1540  na  1602 1,48 1664 1,37 1726 1,05 1788 1,45 1850 1,57 1912 2,96 
1479  na  1541  na  1603 1,56 1665 1,33 1727 0,95 1789 1,41 1851 1,68 1913 2,97 
1480  na  1542  na  1604 2,33 1666 1,43 1728 1,15 1790 1,79 1852 1,67 1914 2,97 
1481 na 1543 na 1605  2,12  1667  1,61  1729  1,23  1791  1,48  1853 1,8 1915 na 
1482 na 1544 na 1606  2,09  1668  1,72  1730  0,89  1792  1,47  1854 na 1916 na 
1483 na 1545 na 1607 na 1669  1,54  1731  1,15  1793  1,65  1855  2,33  1917 na 
1484 na 1546 na 1608 na 1670 1,5 1732 na 1794 na 1856  2,99  1918 na 
1485 na 1547 na 1609 na 1671  1,45  1733 na 1795  1,34  1857  2,96     
1486  na  1548  na  1610 1,48 1672 1,59 1734 0,97 1796 1,38 1858 3,13     
1487  na  1549  na  1611 1,37 1673 1,48 1735 0,97 1797 1,63 1859 2,74     
1488 na 1550 na 1612  1,37  1674 1,6 1736  1,14  1798  1,37  1860  2,72     
1489 1,02 1551  na  1613 1,35 1675 1,75 1737 1,17 1799 1,36 1861 3,24     
1490 0,85 1552  na  1614 1,39 1676 1,87 1738 1,28 1800  na  1862 2,91     
1491 na 1553 na 1615  1,61  1677  1,86  1739 1,2 1801  1,41  1863 na     
1492 na 1554 na 1616  1,75  1678  1,81  1740  1,53  1802  1,33  1864 na     
1493  na  1555 1,14 1617 1,69 1679 2,01 1741 1,53 1803  1,6  1865  na     
1494  na  1556 1,35 1618 1,29 1680 1,84 1742 1,49 1804 1,86 1866  na     
1495 na 1557 na 1619  1,43  1681 1,8 1743  1,24  1805  2,36  1867  2,63     
1496 na 1558 na 1620  1,49  1682  1,63  1744  1,12  1806 1,9 1868  2,64     
1497  na  1559  na  1621 2,29 1683 1,87 1745 1,45 1807 2,43 1869 2,39     
1498 na 1560 na 1622  1,91  1684 1,7 1746  1,03  1808 2,4 1870  2,71     
1499 na 1561 na 1623 na 1685  1,78  1747  1,41  1809  1,86  1871  2,59     
1500  na  1562  na  1624 0,93 1686 1,95 1748 1,53 1810 1,36 1872 2,77     
1501 na 1563 na 1625  2,04  1687  1,84  1749  1,56  1811 2,1 1873  3,01     
1502  na  1564  na  1626 1,36 1688 1,72 1750 1,38 1812 1,61 1874 2,75     
1503  na  1565  na  1627 1,52 1689 1,75 1751 1,42 1813 1,62 1875 2,54     
1504  na  1566  na  1628 1,17 1690 1,16 1752 1,29 1814 1,66 1876 2,46     
1505  na  1567  na  1629 1,15 1691 1,44 1753 1,08 1815 1,66 1877 2,53     
1506  na  1568  na  1630 1,16 1692 1,35 1754 1,08 1816 1,76 1878 2,31     
1507  na  1569 1,32 1631 1,35 1693 1,12 1755 1,42 1817  1,8  1879  2,4     
1508  na  1570 1,37 1632 1,43 1694  na  1756 1,43 1818 2,19 1880 2,41     
1509 na 1571 na 1633  1,22  1695 na 1757  1,35  1819  2,86  1881 na     
1510 na 1572 na 1634  1,23  1696  1,22  1758  1,35  1820 1,4 1882 na     
1511  na  1573 1,46 1635 1,05 1697  1,1  1759 1,19 1821 1,47 1883  na     
1512  na  1574  1,4  1636 1,11 1698 1,14 1760 1,21 1822 1,18 1884 2,15     
1513  na  1575 1,41 1637 1,31 1699 1,12 1761 1,11 1823 1,19 1885  2     
1514  na  1576  na  1638 1,32 1700 1,21 1762 1,36 1824 1,16 1886 2,23     
1515  na  1577  na  1639 1,26 1701 1,06 1763 1,02 1825 1,16 1887 2,46     
1516  na  1578  na  1640 0,97 1702 0,77 1764 1,06 1826 1,48 1888 2,37     
1517  na  1579  na  1641 1,44 1703 0,76 1765 1,08 1827 1,63 1889 2,46     
1518  na  1580  na  1642 1,39 1704 0,81 1766 1,09 1828 1,31 1890 2,55     
1519  na  1581  na  1643 1,23 1705 1,14 1767 1,22 1829 0,59 1891 2,65     
1520 na 1582 na 1644 1,3 1706  0,85  1768  1,34  1830  0,59  1892  2,37     
1521  na  1583  na  1645 1,28 1707 0,84 1769 1,78 1831 0,56 1893 2,35     
1522 na 1584 na 1646  1,35  1708 na 1770  2,12  1832  1,04  1894  2,15     
1523  na  1585 1,67 1647 1,36 1709 0,85 1771 2,11 1833 1,04 1895 2,18     
1524  na  1586 1,32 1648 1,54 1710 0,82 1772 2,07 1834 1,11 1896 2,12     
1525  na  1587  1,4  1649 1,55 1711 1,09 1773 1,91 1835 1,23 1897 2,05     
1526  na  1588 1,76 1650 1,39 1712 1,02 1774  1,8  1836 1,02 1898 2,04     
1527  1,4  1589 1,22 1651  na  1713 0,95 1775 1,25 1837 1,75 1899 2,01     
1528 1,43 1590 1,71 1652 1,42 1714 1,14 1776  na  1838 1,46 1900 2,03     
1529  na  1591 1,31 1653 1,48 1715 1,11 1777  na  1839 1,36 1901 1,89     
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Table 4: Inflation Results Based on the CPI 
 
SAMPLE  PANEL A: 1586 - 1913  PANEL B: 1586 – 1699 
(Slow Down Period) 
PANEL C: 1700 – 1792 
(Recession Period) 
PANEL D: 1793 – 1913 
(Break Up Period) 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  V 
constant  0.024**  0.015      0.020**  0.023**  0.024*  -0.020    0.025 0.013 0.016    0.001  0.027**  0.024*    0.027*  0.025* 
  (2.651) (1.397)      (2.148) (2.498) (1.771) (-1.042)   (1.835) (0.686) (0.721)   (0.032) (2.140) (1.769)   (1.949) (1.832)
πt-1  -0.259** -0.267** -0.262** -0.372** -0.256** -0.261**  -0.072  -0.097  -0.089  -0.071  -0.240* -0.236* -0.395** -0.217* -0.497** -0.501** -0.614** -0.493** -0.502**
  (-3.603) (-3.778) (-3.602) (-4.749) (-3.619) (-3.625) (-0.614) (-0.860) (-0.625) (-0.596) (-1.815) (-1.799) (-3.159) (-1.662) (-4.173) (-4.239) (-4.704) (-4.024) (-4.214)
πt-2  -0.110*  -0.113*  -0.112*  -0.217**  -0.105*  -0.111* -0.079 -0.102 -0.113 -0.078 -0.142 -0.140  -0.247** -0.068 -0.126 -0.119  -0.298** -0.125 -0.129 
  (-1.741) (-1.804) (-1.759) (-3.230) (-1.691) (-1.756) (-0.671) (-0.942) (-0.843) (-0657) (-1.251) (-1.237) (-2.412) (-0.597) (-1.168) (-1.111) (-2.449) (-1.170) (-1.193)
πt-3  -0.081 -0.079 -0.083  -0.146**  -0.090 -0.082 -0.210 -0.198 -0.208* -0.209 -0.102 -0.093 -0.141 -0.122 0.091  0.106 -0.039 0.088  0.091 
  (-1.148) (-1.122) (-1.175) (-1.998) (-1.288) (-1.159) (-1.553) (-1.547) (-1.687) (-1.533) (-0.744) (-0.666) (-0.968) (-0.897) (1.209)  (1.419) (-0.448) (1.147) (1.199)
πt-4  0.007 0.010 0.003 -0.053 0.007 0.005 -0.011 0.035 -0.056 -0.013 -0.033 -0.023 -0.074 -0.063 0.137* 0.144* 0.049  0.134  0.135 
  (0.117) (0.165) (0.049) (-0.845) (0.116) (0.085) (-0.112) (0.355) (-0.602) (-0.121) (-0.270) (-0.175) (-0.582) (-0.525) (1.678) (1.772) (0.522) (1.623) (1.642)
war    0.027        0.074**     -0.010      0.040     
    (1.496)        (2.670)     (0.258)     (1.339)    
slow  down     0 . 0 2 8 * *                   
     (1.963)                  
recession     0 . 0 1 2                   
     (0.667)                  
break up     0 . 0 3 1 * *                   
     (2.345)                  
first       0.046       -0.003      0.140**      0.010   
       (1.148)       (-0.054)     (2.634)      (0.287)  
constitution        0 . 0 3 4 * *                0 . 0 3 5 *  
        (2.116)               (1.809)
MURAD III      0 . 0 2 5        0 . 0 4 4             
      (0.338)       (0.496)           
MEHMED III      0 . 0 4 8        0 . 0 3 8             
      (0.904)       (0.884)           
AHMED I      0 . 1 3 9 * *        0 . 1 0 0             
      (2.556)       (1.549)           
MUSTAFA I      -0.043       -0.111            
      (-0.232)       (-0.716)           
OSMAN II      0 . 0 8 1        0 . 1 0 8             
      (0.700)       (0.716)           
MURAD IV      0 . 0 4 1 *        0 . 0 2 9             
      (1.771)       (1.203)           
IBRAHIM      -0.059       -0.044            
      (-1.532)       (-1.264)           
MEHMED IV      0 . 0 2 6        0 . 0 1 9             
      (1.509)       (1.806)           
SÜLEYMAN II      -0.009       0.003            
      (-0.363)       (1.132)           
AHMED II      0 . 0 3 1        0 . 0 0 2             
      (0.343)       (0.023)           
MUSTAFA II      -0.204**       0.000      -0.208**       
      (-3.267)       (0.000)     (-3.296)       
AHMED III      0 . 0 0 6            0 . 0 0 6         
      ( 0 . 2 3 9 )            ( 0 . 2 6 0 )       
MAHMUD I      0 . 0 0 9            0 . 0 0 9         
      ( 0 . 2 3 4 )            ( 0 . 2 2 9 )       
OSMAN III      0 . 1 7 8 * *            0 . 1 8 0 * *       
      ( 4 . 3 7 6 )            ( 4 . 1 7 7 )       
MUSTAFA III      0 . 0 5 3            0 . 0 5 6         
      ( 1 . 4 3 8 )            ( 1 . 4 2 8 )       
ABDÜLHAMID I      -0.054           -0.055        
      (-1.001)           (-1.023)       
SELIM III      0.103           0.145*      0.019    
      ( 1 . 6 1 8 )            ( 1 . 8 2 2 )     ( 0 . 5 0 8 )   
MUSTAFA IV      0 . 1 6 0 * *                0 . 1 2 7 * *   
      ( 2 . 4 7 7 )                ( 2 . 6 9 8 )   
MAHMUD II      0 . 0 7 6 * *                0 . 0 8 3 * *   
      ( 2 . 5 7 2 )                ( 2 . 6 5 1 )   
ABDÜLMECID      0 . 0 1 8                0 . 0 0 9     
      ( 0 . 6 5 9 )                ( 0 . 3 3 9 )   
ABDÜLAZIZ      0 . 0 2 2                0 . 0 3 0     
      ( 0 . 5 8 8 )                ( 0 . 8 5 4 )   
MURAD V      - 0 . 0 6 6 * *                - 0 . 1 0 8 * *   
      (-5.504)               (-5.623)   
ABDÜLHAMID II      -0.005               -0.006    
      (-0.398)               (-0.442)   
MEHMET 
REŞAD V 
     0.077** 
(5.328)                  0.085**
(4.772)    
                       
                     
SSR  4.361 4.322 4.346 3.801 4.316 4.353 1.313 1.208 1.203 1.313 1.722 1.720 1.401 1.624 1.108 1.099 0.982 1.107 1.099 
R
2  0.067 0.076 0.071 0.187 0.077 0.069 0.047 0.124 0.127 0.047 0.059 0.059 0.235 0.113 0.241 0.246 .0326 0.241 0.246 
 
t-ratios are reported in parentheses. 
*       10% significance level. 
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Table 5: Results Based on the Silver Content in Akçe 
 
SAMPLE  PANEL A: 1586 - 1913  PANEL B: 1586 – 1699 
(Slow Down Period) 
PANEL C: 1700 – 1792 
(Recession Period) 
PANEL D: 1793 – 1913 
(Break Up Period) 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  V 
constant 
-0.016** 
(-2.742)  -0.022** 
(-2.487)     -0.013** 
(-2.158) 
-0.016** 
















































































































































































war   0.018 
(1.544)         -0.011 
(-0.382)
     0.014* 
(1.766)     0.094**
(2.053)
     
slow down      -0.012 
(-1.028)                      
recession      -0.011* 
(-1.821)                      
break up     - 0 . 0 2 4 * *                   
     (-2.157)                  
first        -0.029 
(-1.474) 
       -0.031 
(-1.378)
    -0.057 
(-1.235)       -0.018 
(-0.457)
 
constitution         0.016** 
(2.743)                 0.027**
(2.172)
MURAD III       -0.022 
(-1.017)         -0.012 
(-0.914)             
MEHMED III       -0.029 
(-0.614)         -0.029 
(-0.584)             
AHMED I       0.007 
(0.957)         0.004 
(0.843)             
MUSTAFA I       -0.130** 
(-2.477)         -0.127**
(-2.430)             
OSMAN II       0.022 
(1.143)         0.019 
(1.006)             
MURAD IV       -0.023 
(-1.095)         -0.035*
(-1.847)             
IBRAHIM       0.068 
(1.025)         0.074 
(0.998)             
MEHMED IV       -0.012* 
(-1.699)         -0.013*
(-1.811)             
SÜLEYMAN II       -0.159 
(-1.225)         -0.159 
(-1.225)             
AHMED II       -0.032 
(-0.639)         -0.067 
(-1.237)             
MUSTAFA II       0.000 
(0.000)         0.000 
(0.000)      0.000 
(0.000)         
AHMED III       -0.001 
(-0.268)               0.001 
(0.054)         
MAHMUD I       -0.004* 
(-1.729)               -0.006** 
(-2.180)         
OSMAN III       -0.074 
(-1.226)               -0.081 
(-1.363)         
MUSTAFA III       -0.005 
(-0.845)               -0.015* 
(-1.646)         
ABDÜLHAMID I       -0.018** 
(-2.147)               -0.022** 
(-2.329)         
SELIM III       -0.075 
(-1.504)               -0.175** 
(-1.963)     -0.043 
(-1.059)    
MUSTAFA IV       0.000 
(0.000)                  0.000 
(0.000)     
MAHMUD II       -0.082** 
(-2.450)                  -0.083**
(-2.232)    
ABDÜLMECID       0.006 
(1.348)                  0.006 
(1.267)     
ABDÜLAZIZ       0.000 
(0.000)                  0.000 
(0.000)     
MURAD V       0.000 
(0.000)                  0.000 
(0.000)     
ABDÜLHAMID II       0.000 
(0.000)                  0.000 
(0.000)     
MEHMET 
REŞAD V 
     0.000 
(0.000)                  0.000 
(0.000)     
                     
                     
SSR  2.376 2.359 2.367 2.076 2.357 2.374 0.857 0.855 0.706 0.848 0.147 0.144 0.088 0.132 1.277 1.231 1.159 1.275 1.272 
R
2  0.047 0.054 0.051 0.168 0.055 0.048 0.015 0.018 0.189 0.026 0.011 0.031 0.403 0.116 0.131 0.163 0.210 0.133 0.134 
 
t-ratios are reported in parentheses. 
*       10% significance level. 
**     5% significance level. 
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Table 6: Results Based on the CPI Silver Grams 
 
SAMPLE  PANEL A: 1586 - 1913  PANEL B: 1586 – 1699 
(Slow Down Period) 
PANEL C: 1700 – 1792 
(Recession Period) 
PANEL D: 1793 – 1913 
(Break Up Period) 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  V 
constant  0.005 
(0.456) 
-0.010 























































































































































































war   0.045** 
(2.234)         0.063**
(2.094)
     0.016 
(0.404)     0.103* 
(1.732)
     
slow down      0.011 
(0.749)                      
recession      -0.001 
(0.749)                      
break up      0.002 
(0.123)                      
first        0.015 
(0.386) 
       -0.022 
(-0.365)
    0.069 
(1.204)       0.051 
(0.795)
 
constitution         0.066** 
(3.399)                 0.070**
(2.530)
MURAD III       0.022 
(0.317)         0.002 
(0.033)             
MEHMED III       0.009 
(0.219)         0.019 
(0.510)             
AHMED I       0.141** 
(2.334)         0.195**
(3.383)             
MUSTAFA I       -0.191 
(-1.641)         -0.099 
(-0.773)             
OSMAN II       0.109 
(1.150)         0.069 
(0.647)             
MURAD IV 
 
   -0.009 












IBRAHIM       0.032 
(0.658)         0.038 

















SÜLEYMAN II       -0.160 
(-1.504)         -0.166 
(-1.499)             
AHMED II       -0.095 
(-1.268)         -0.159**
(-2.701)             
MUSTAFA II       -0.201** 
(-3.316)         0.000 
(0.000)      -0.206**
(-3.110)        
AHMED III       0.004 
(0.131)               0.006 
(0.238)        
MAHMUD I       0.009 
(0.236)               0.003 
(0.079)        
OSMAN III       0.079 
(1.289)               0.101 
(1.595)        
MUSTAFA III       0.049 
(1.314)               0.043 
(1.128)        
ABDÜLHAMID I       -0.078 
(-1.468)               -0.074 
(-1.326)        
SELIM III       0.003 
(0.055)               -0.004 
(-0.072)    0.024 
(0.263)    
MUSTAFA IV       0.197** 
(2.786)                  0.208**
(2.716)    
MAHMUD II       -0.032 
(-0.659)                  -0.033 
(-0.659)    
ABDÜLMECID       0.032 
(1.236)                  0.034 
(1.231)    
ABDÜLAZIZ       0.022 
(0.580)                  0.018 
(0.452)    
MURAD V       -0.049** 
(-3.757)                  -0.029 
(-1.532)    
ABDULHAMID II       -0.006 
(-0.462)                  -0.005 
(-0.402)    
MEHMET 
REŞAD V 
     0.084** 
(4.761)                  0.078**
(3.474)    
                     
                     
SSR  6.108 5.999 6.102 5.435 6.103 6.079 1.609 1.529 1.239 1.604 1.614 1.611 1.403 1.591 2.774 2.719 2.619 2.758 2.743 
R
2  0.09  0.116 0.101 0.199 0.100 0.104 0.184 0.224 0.371 0.186 0.074 0.076 0.195 0.087 0.095 0.113 0.146 0.100 0.105 
 
t-ratios are reported in parentheses. 
*       10% significance level. 
**     5% significance level. 
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This supplementary material provides additional empirical evidence that is not reported in 
the original paper.      2
Table S1: Inflation Results Based on the CPI 
 
SAMPLE  PANEL A: 1478 - 1913  PANEL B: 1586 – 1699 
(Slow Down Period) 
PANEL C: 1700 – 1792 
(Recession Period) 
PANEL D: 1793 – 1913 
(Break Up Period) 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  V 
constant  0.020** 0.013      0.017* 0.019** 0.015  -0.021    0.016  0.011  0.008    0.001 0.034**  0.033**   0.032** 0.032**
  (2.469) (1.329)      (1.991) (2.321) (1.111) (-1.109)   (1.167) (0.685) (0.361)   (0.074) (2.711) (2.503)   (2.385) (2.426)
πt-1  -0.219** -0.225** -0.222** -0.262** -0.217** -0.221**  -0.085  -0.107  -0.067  -0.084  -0.196  -0.199  -0.295**  -0.180  -0397** -0.399** -0.436** 0.111** -0.399**
  (-3.362) (-3.470) (-3.367) (-3.844) (-3.369) (-3.378) (-0.790) (-1.019) (-0.538) (-0.756) (-1.613) (-1.640) (-2.503) (-1.509) (-3.655) (-3.698) (-3.825) (-3.520) (-3.684)
war    0.021        0.056**     0.012      0.023     
    (1.228)        (2.117)     (0.339)     (0.772)    
rise     -0.004                  
     (-1.439)                  
slow down     0 . 0 1 8                   
     (1.281)                  
recession     0 . 0 1 2                   
     (0.697)                  
break up     0 . 0 2 9 * *                   
     (2.446)                  
first       0.042       -0.007      0.138**      0.023   
       (1.067)       (-0.102)     (2.598)      (0.699)  
constitution        0 . 0 3 2 * *                0 . 0 2 7  
        (2.169)               (1.479)
MURAD III      0 . 0 2 7        0 . 0 2 2             
      (0.432)       (0.286)           
MEHMED III      0 . 0 2 9        0 . 0 2 3             
      (0.595)       (0.525)           
AHMED I      0 . 0 7 1        0 . 0 5 9             
      (1.562)       (1.305)           
MUSTAFA I      -0.102       -0.149            
      (-0.554)       (-0.925)           
OSMAN II      0 . 1 0 2        0 . 1 1 9             
      (0.923)       (1.171)           
MURAD IV      -0.005       -0.003            
      (-0.128)       (-0.101)           
IBRAHIM      -0.038       -0.029            
      (-1.103)       (-0.892)           
MEHMED IV      0 . 0 1 7        0 . 0 1 3             
      (1.022)       (0.789)           
SÜLEYMAN II      -0.008       -0.001            
      (-0.229)       (-0.023)           
AHMED II      0.005       -0.009            
      (0.046)       (-0.087)           
MUSTAFA II      -0.081       0.008      -0.127*        
      (-1.459)       (0.488)     (-1.645)        
AHMED III      0 . 0 1 4            0 . 0 1 4         
      ( 0 . 4 9 9 )            ( 0 . 5 2 4 )         
MAHMUD I      0 . 0 1 9            0 . 0 1 8         
      ( 0 . 5 4 5 )            ( 0 . 5 4 2 )         
OSMAN III      0 . 1 7 5 * *            0 . 1 7 8 * *         
      ( 3 . 5 8 8 )            ( 3 . 7 2 1 )         
MUSTAFA III      0 . 0 3 0            0 . 0 3 2         
      ( 0 . 9 0 5 )            ( 0 . 9 4 4 )         
ABDÜLHAMID I      -0.059           -0.059        
      (-1.428)           (-1.441)        
SELIM III      0.084*           0.107      0.086    
      ( 1 . 7 2 5 )            ( 1 . 0 8 1 )       ( 1 . 5 8 4 )   
MUSTAFA IV      0 . 1 1 9 * *                0 . 1 2 1 * *   
      ( 2 . 4 9 4 )                ( 6 . 2 1 5 )   
MAHMUD II      0 . 0 5 2 *                0 . 0 5 9 * *   
      ( 1 . 7 8 4 )                ( 2 . 0 0 1 )   
ABDÜLMECID      0 . 0 1 0                0 . 0 1 3     
      ( 0 . 4 2 2 )                ( 0 . 5 0 3 )   
ABDÜLAZIZ      0 . 0 0 9                0 . 0 1 3     
      ( 0 . 2 9 8 )                ( 0 . 4 3 5 )   
MURAD V      - 0 . 0 5 4 * *                - 0 . 0 6 7 * *   
      (-9.946)               (-7.478)   
ABDÜLHAMID II      0 . 0 0 7                0 . 0 0 7     
      ( 0 . 6 3 6 )                ( 0 . 6 0 3 )   
MEHMET 
REŞAD V 
     0.052** 
(3.691)                  0.061**
(4.065)    
                     
                     
SSR  5.194 5.166 5.178 4.788 5.154 5.187 1.760 1.689 1.661 1.759 1.918 1.916 1.676 1.813 1.411 1.408 1.310 1.407 1.406 
R
2  0.060 0.065 0.063 0.133 0.067 0.062 0.008 0.047 0.063 0.008 0.034 0.036 0.157 0.087 0.161 0.163 0.221 0.164 0.164 
 
t-ratios are reported in parentheses. 
*       10% significance level. 
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Table S2: Results Based on the Silver Content in Akçe 
 
SAMPLE  PANEL A: 1478 - 1913  PANEL B: 1586 – 1699 
(Slow Down Period) 
PANEL C: 1700 – 1792 
(Recession Period) 
PANEL D: 1793 – 1913 
(Break Up Period) 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  V 
constant  -0.013**  -0.018**    -0.010**  -0.013**  -0.012  -0.005    -0.009  -0.009** -0.014**   -0.006*  -0.016*  -0.023**   -0.014  -0.017*
  (-2.569) (-2.447)      (-1.979) (-2.569) (-1.261) (-0.216)   (-0.931) (-2.149) (-2.172)   (-1.778) (-1.652) (-2.418)   (-1.405) (-1.654)
debasementt-1  0.029 0.029 0.028 0.003 0.024 0.029 -0.038  -0.041  -0.044  -0.045 0.073 0.048 -0.113  -0.039 0.110 0.127 0.060 0.112 0.109 
  (0.286) (0.289) (0.279) (0.031) (0.229) (0.283) (-0.969) (-0.938) (-0.761) (-1.068) (0.595) (0.418) (-0.756) (-0.559) (0.469) (0.581) (0.272) (0.479) (0.464)
war    0.013        -0.010      0.013*      0.125     
    (1.297)        (-0.399)     (1.940)     (1.360)    
rise     0 . 0 0 0                   
     (0.000)                  
slow down     -0.012                  
     (-1.198)                  
recession     - 0 . 0 0 9 *                   
     (-1.948)                  
break up     -0.017                  
     (-1.579)                  
first       -0.031       -0.029      -0.057      -0.028   
       (-1.626)       (-1.410)     (-1.234)      (-0.702)  
constitution        0 . 0 1 3 * *                0 . 0 1 6 *  
        (2.569)               (1.654)
MURAD III      0.001       -0.003            
      (0.031)       (-0.653)           
MEHMED III      -0.018       -0.018            
      (-0.351)       (-0.367)           
AHMED I      0 . 0 0 0        0 . 0 0 0             
      (0.000)       (0.000)           
MUSTAFA I      - 0 . 1 2 7 * *        - 0 . 1 2 7 * *           
      (-2.559)       (-2.546)           
OSMAN II      0 . 0 2 3        0 . 0 2 3             
      (1.278)       (1.248)           
MURAD IV      - 0 . 0 3 2 *        - 0 . 0 3 0 *           
      (-1.852)       (-1.764)           
IBRAHIM      0 . 0 4 9        0 . 0 5 1             
      (0.779)       (0.815)           
MEHMED IV      -0.008       -0.008            
      (-1.344)       (-1.417)           
SÜLEYMAN II      -0.159       -0.159            
      (-1.225)       (-1.225)           
AHMED II      0.001       -0.007            
      (0.031)       (-0.655)           
MUSTAFA II      0.000       0.000      0.000        
      (0.000)       (0.000)     (0.000)       
AHMED III      -0.001           -0.001        
      (-0.433)           (-0.383)       
MAHMUD I      -0.002           -0.003*       
      (-1.435)           (-1.657)       
OSMAN III      -0.072           -0.073        
      (-1.224)           (-1.247)       
MUSTAFA III      0.001           -0.001        
      (0.410)           (-0.428)       
ABDÜLHAMID I      - 0 . 0 1 8 *            - 0 . 0 1 9 * *       
      (-1.951)           (-2.108)       
SELIM III      -0.026           -0.088      0.000    
      (-1.036)           (-1.183)     (0.000)   
MUSTAFA IV      0 . 0 0 0                0 . 0 0 0     
      ( 0 . 0 0 0 )                ( 0 . 0 0 0 )   
MAHMUD II      - 0 . 0 5 9 *                - 0 . 0 5 6 *   
      (-1.708)               (-1.809)   
ABDÜLMECID      0 . 0 0 4                0 . 0 0 3     
      ( 1 . 0 2 0 )                ( 0 . 9 3 8 )   
ABDÜLAZIZ      0 . 0 0 0                0 . 0 0 0     
      ( 0 . 0 0 0 )                ( 0 . 0 0 0 )   
MURAD V      0 . 0 0 0                0 . 0 0 0     
      ( 0 . 0 0 0 )                ( 0 . 0 0 0 )   
ABDÜLHAMID II      0 . 0 0 0                0 . 0 0 0     
      ( 0 . 0 0 0 )                ( 0 . 0 0 0 )   
MEHMET 
REŞAD V 
     0.000 
(0.000)                  0.000 
(0.000)    
                     
                     
SSR  2.537 2.525 2.533 2.306 2.513 2.536 0.903 0.901 0.770 0.894 0.155 0.152 0.118 0.139 1.457 1.369 1.392 1.452 1.455 
R
2  0.001 0.006 0.002 0.092 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.150 0.013 0.005 0.024 0.239 0.108 0.012 0.071 0.057 0.015 0.013 
 
t-ratios are reported in parentheses. 
*       10% significance level. 










   4
 
Table S3: Results Based on the CPI Silver Grams 
 
SAMPLE  PANEL A: 1478 - 1913  PANEL B: 1586 – 1699 
(Slow Down Period) 
PANEL C: 1700 – 1792 
(Recession Period) 
PANEL D: 1793 – 1913 
(Break Up Period) 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  I II  III  IV  V 
constant  0.005 -0.008      0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.026    0.009 -0.001 -0.010    -0.005 0.008 0.001    0.007 0.005 
  (0.478) (-0.648)      (0.422) (0.339) (0.376) (-1.105)   (0.604) (-0.009) (-0.510)   (-0.321) (0.449) (0.014)   (0.355) (0.259)
fiscal 
expansiont-1 
-0.257**  -0.263** -0.257** -0.272** -0.256** -0.259**  -0.364** -0.369** -0.348** -0.363** -0.224* -0.239** -0.302** -0.202*  -0.179  -0.178 -0.199* -0.177  -0.182 
  (-3.935) (-4.034) (-3.921) (-4.218) (-3.915) (-3.963) (-5.107) (-4.993) (-4.536) (-5.026) (-1.857) (-1.992) (-2.595) (-1.688) (-1.544) (-1.557) (-1.779) (-1.518) (-1.577)
war    0.036*        0.049*      0.031      0.131     
    (1.843)        (1.660)     (0.895)     (1.436)    
rise     -0.004                  
     (1.337)                  
slow down     0 . 0 0 4                   
     (0.295)                  
recession     -0.001                  
     (-0.009)                  
break up     0 . 0 0 9                   
     (0.483)                  
first       0.005       -0.035      0.073      0.019   
       (0.118)       (-0.534)     (1.326)      (0.327)  
constitution        0 . 0 5 0 * *                0 . 0 4 5 * *
        (3.185)               (2.054)
MURAD III      0 . 0 1 2        0 . 0 0 9             
      (0.174)       (0.148)           
MEHMED III      0 . 0 0 4        0 . 0 0 5             
      (0.104)       (0.126)           
AHMED I      0 . 0 7 2        0 . 0 7 6             
      (1.565)       (1.636)           
MUSTAFA I      -0.234*       -0.215            
      (-1.779)       (-1.515)           
OSMAN II      0 . 1 2 3        0 . 1 1 6             
      (1.206)       (1.081)           
MURAD IV      -0.028       -0.026            
      (-0.858)       (-0.826)           
IBRAHIM      0 . 0 2 3        0 . 0 2 3             
      (0.448)       (0.457)           
MEHMED IV      0 . 0 0 7        0 . 0 0 8             
      (0.356)       (0.399)           
SÜLEYMAN II      -0.164       -0.166*           
      (-1.618)       (-1.672)           
AHMED II      -0.035       -0.042            
      (-0.479)       (-0.599)           
MUSTAFA II      -0.083       -0.003      -0.127        
      (-1.466)       (-0.893)     (-1.625)        
AHMED III      0 . 0 1 3            0 . 0 1 3         
      ( 0 . 4 5 4 )            ( 0 . 4 7 7 )         
MAHMUD I      0 . 0 1 5            0 . 0 1 5         
      (0.454)           (0.447)        
OSMAN III      0 . 0 9 9            0 . 1 0 3         
      (1.273)           (1.288)        
MUSTAFA III      0 . 0 2 8            0 . 0 2 9         
      (0.824)           (0.850)        
ABDÜLHAMID I      - 0 . 0 8 1 *            - 0 . 0 8 3 *         
      (-1.949)           (-1.942)        
SELIM III      0.051           0.003      0.070    
      (1.173)           (0.043)      (1.295)   
MUSTAFA IV      0 . 1 2 1 * *                  0 . 1 1 9 * *   
      (2.579)                 (2.036)   
MAHMUD II      - 0 . 0 2 3                  - 0 . 0 2 1     
      (-0.442)                 (-0.422)   
ABDÜLMECID      0 . 0 1 5                  0 . 0 1 3     
      (0.622)                 (0.565)   
ABDÜLAZIZ      0 . 0 0 9                  0 . 0 0 8     
      (0.304)                 (0.245)   
MURAD V      - 0 . 0 5 4 * *                  - 0 . 0 4 8 * *   
      (-9.458)                 (-5.379)   
ABDÜLHAMID II      0 . 0 0 7                  0 . 0 0 7     
      (0.627)                 (0.636)   
MEHMET 
REŞAD V 
     0.053** 
(3.728)                     0.049**
(3.268)    
                         
                         
SSR  7.101 7.020 7.097  6.584  7.100 7.084 2.019 1.966  1.769 2.007 1.824 1.807  1.642  1.795 3.197 3.100  3.104 3.195 3.184 
R
2  0.069 0.081 0.070  0.138  0.070 0.072 0.165 0.187  0.269 0.170 0.045 0.053  0.140  0.140 0.032 0.062  0.061 0.033 0.036 
 
t-ratios are reported in parentheses. 
*       10% significance level. 
**     5% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 